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SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE, AND THE
PENNSYLVANIA SITUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The relatively recent flood of population from city to suburb' has
threatened to drown both judiciary and legislature in the task of reconciling
closely competing interests. The most perplexing of these confrontations
is that between the legal right of new residents to settle where they wish
and the suburban desire to exclude newcomers. The matter is especially
problematic because, unlike the emotional or racial underpinnings which
have dominated such exclusion in the past, this exclusionary intent can be
explained in terms of more rational, sometimes laudable, factors. For
example, there is an understandable suburban wish to maintain a less
crowded lifestyle which requires, by definition, that a limit be placed upon
the number of incoming residents. Not without significant difficulty, the
courts have weighed what is essentially an aesthetic interest against the
requirements of an expanding population, and, despite their police power
rationales, have struck down exclusionary regulations geared toward this
end.2
There, is however, another foundation for the desire to limit the
ingress of persons into a suburban area which transcends the subjective
1. See Suburbia: The New American Plurality, TIME, Mar. 15, 1971, at 14;
New Role of the Suburbs, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Aug. 7, 1972, at 52.
2. Exclusionary zoning devices such as minimum-acre lot size, floor space, and
set back requirements, have generally been invalidated by the courts on the grounds
that these devices hinder the migration of the less wealthy to the subject areas, and,
therefore, such devices have an effect outside the permissible goals of zoning. See
generally Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the
Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (1972) ; Davidoff & Gold, Exclusionary
Zoning, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 56 (1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767
(1969); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). But see Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (ordinance prohibiting more than two individuals
unrelated by blood from living in the same dwelling unit upheld).
While exclusionary zoning ordinances have generally been invalidated, there
is a growing popularity of ordinances whereby communities accommodate population
growth by means of bona fide sequential development and timed-growth schemes. See
Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) ; Golden
v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See also Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid
to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56
(1973); Freilich, Editor's Comments: Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a
New Dimension in American Planning Law, 4 URBAN LAW., Summer, 1972; Comment,
The Limits of Permissible Exclusion in Fiscal Zoning, 53 B.U.L. REV. 453 (1973).
(782)
1
Trachtman: Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
MAY 19741 COMMENT
preference for the maintenance of open space. It focuses instead upon the
quantifiable amounts of dollars and cents required to properly service a
larger population, and the question becomes what a municipality can afford,
rather than what it would prefer. This fact has left suburban areas with
two general alternatives: devise a method to keep such migration to a
minimum; or assure that a revenue source is available to fund the cost of
government attributable to the new residents. With regard to the former
alternative, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, confronted with attempts to
avoid this financial burden through restrictive zoning measures, has stated
a clear response:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto
undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have
concluded not.
3
This resolute stance, echoed frequently throughout the country, 4
pressures municipalities to discover acceptable variants of the second alter-
native - the finding of monies to fund services for their expanded popu-
lation. A logical alternative from the municipal point of view would seem
to be one which shifts this financial burden generated by newcomers from
longtime residents to the newcomers themselves. For example, instead of
enforcing a uniform property tax rate against both longtime resident and
newcomer to finance the expansion of municipal facilities, a municipality
might act to avoid the situation where "older residents may be penalized
by newcomers" by exacting increased costs from the newcomer alone.'
To the extent that new arrivals often settle in housing developments com-
monly known as subdivisions, the "subdivision exaction" seeks to do just
that.6
3. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119,
1120 (1964).
6. The term "subdivision" actually refers to the end product of the process
whereby a municipality divides its land into parcels for development pursuant to an
overall planning scheme. Consequently, what constitutes a subdivision varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to the historical division of land and the plan-
ning goals involved. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 19.01-.02,
at 377-85 (1968). In Pennsylvania, "subdivision" is defined in the Municipalities
Planning Code as
the division or redivision of a lot, tract or parcel of land by any means into two
or more lots, tracts, parcels or other divisions of land including changes in exist-
ing lot lines for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of lease, transfer of
ownership or building or lot development: Provided, however, that the division
of land for agricultural purposes into parcels of more than ten acres, not in-
volving any new street or easement of access, shall be exempted.
53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(21) (1972).
For an extensive discussion of subdivision controls in general, including their
historical development and the local procedures implementing them, see generally
R. ANDERSON, supra, ch. 19. See also Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for the
Control of Land Subdivision, 36 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1971), for an overview of the specific
scheme in the state of Missouri.
2
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The term "subdivision exaction" cannot be defined with precision.
Basically, the term is used here to describe those conditions which mu-
nicipalities may impose, pursuant to appropriate enabling statutes, before
rendering approval of a subdivision developer's plat, without which approval
the developer could not record and market the individual lots which com-
prise his tract of land. 7 Most typically, these conditions take the form of
compulsory dedication - conveyance without charge to the municipality
- of land for streets, 8 and the construction of improvements such as the
streets themselves, sewers," sidewalks, 10 water facilities," and curbs and
gutters. 12 The municipality will often require the dedication of land for
purposes which will also serve the needs of those apart from the sub-
division, such as those for schools or parks. 13 Some will condition their
approval upon the assessment of "equalization fees," charged in lieu of a
7. Some form of subdivision-control enabling statute has been enacted in every
state. See R. ANDERSON & B. RosWIG, PLANNING, ZONING, & SUBDIVISION: A SUM-
MARY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE 50 STATES (1966).
Several relatively old cases construed the ability to record a subdivision plat
as the basis of an exaction's validity. See, e.g., MacFarland v. Miller, 18 App. D.C.
554 (1901) ; Ross v. Goodfellow, 7 App. D.C. 1 (1895). The argument accepted was
that the recording allowed the sale of the plat as a residential subdivision, increasing
its value, and for that benefit the developer should be subject to restriction. 7 App.
D.C. at 10-11. Other cases, in a like manner, argued that since there was no com-
pulsion to so market a tract of land, subdivision was a voluntary act by which the
developer subjected himself to conditions able to be imposed as the municipality deemed
fit. See, e.g., Fortson Inv. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96 (1937).
The demise of these doctrines seems to have begun with Ridgefield Land Co. v. City
of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928), wherein the court stated, "In theory,
at least, the owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets in
return for the advantage and privilege of having his plat recorded." Id. at 472, 217
N.W. at 59 (emphasis added). The language was included as an apparent afterthought
by the court, and the case was decided on a police power rationale, upholding the street
dedication requirement at issue. Id.
Most courts seem to have disregarded the "privilege" rationale, and as to
voluntariness, seem to agree that "it is pure sophistry to characterize as 'voluntary'
any exaction which is expressly required as a condition precedent to plat approval,
when plat approval itself is a prerequisite for recordation." Johnston, The Constitu-
tionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 871, 878 (1967). Typical enabling statutes make approval mandatory. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 435 (1961). Occasionally, however, the voluntariness
rationale appears even in modern cases, but always as dicta. See, e.g., Billings Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964), wherein the
court stated that the "act of attempting to secure approval of the plat was voluntary"
since "[t]here is no law requiring . . . [the developer] . . . to subdivide and sell its
land by plat." Id. at 32, 394 P.2d at 186.
8. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 34, 207 P.2d 1,
3 (1949). The city also required a dedication of a small piece of land for traffic safety
purposes. 34 Cal. 2d at 38-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
9. See, e.g., Medine v. Burns, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
10. See, e.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 489, 178 N.W. 27, 28 (1920).
11. See, e.g., Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 100 N.W.2d
359, 364 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 237, 137 N.E.2d 371,
373-74 (1956).
13. These cases are those which have, of late, provoked the most significant dis-
cussion and which are treated in depth in part II B of this Comment. See, e.g., Asso-
ciated Home Bldrs. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
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land dedication.14 In short, to varying degrees, the subdivision exaction is
a method of contribution which enables the municipality to finance the
construction of capital facilities and the provision of services to the new
area without relying upon the general revenues. It should be noted that the
subdivider's contribution is usually passed on to the eventual homeowner-
buyer.
Aside from the obvious question of statutory authorization, the basic
legal issues raised by such exactions are constitutional ones. In effect,
the subdivision exaction forces the developer to expend land and/or, money
to provide what might otherwise have been characterized as municipal
functions. Hence, the key issue becomes whether the exaction is a reason-
able police power regulation, or a taking through eminent domain which
would require compensation to the developer, There is no severe shortage
of case law in these regards but, as one commentator has noted, there is a
tendency of courts to elaborate upon the conclusions reached rather
than to discuss the factors which actually influenced each decision.
Hence, not only have different theories been used to justify and limit
the use of these devices, but effective analysis has been made even
more difficult by the judiciary's unwillingness to focus upon the in-
terests which these various theories are designed to protect.' "
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the task of interpreting and sorting out
the extant rationales must be accomplished.
Although the ideal world would meet the difficulties of municipal
finance through techniques less problematic, "in the meantime, municipalities
must meet the demands of the day as best they can, finding a few hundred
thousand dollars here and there, wherever they can."'" To do so fairly
and effectively, the task of rationalizing the strictures which do exist must
be approached. To this end, this Comment adopts three goals: first, it
seeks to synthesize the basic constitutional challenges which have been
raised to the subdivision exaction, and the methods by which the various
state courts have acted in an effort to meet them. Since there is no state-
ment from the United States Supreme Court in the area, the goal of this
portion of the Comment is to segment and analyze in some reasoned manner
the varying viewpoints which have evolved. Second, this Comment will
discuss two areas of potential constitutional challenge in an effort to de-
lineate issues not yet seriously raised, but which may demand resolution
in the future. The third objective springs from the observation that, while
14. The courts have split as to the validity of such a fee assessed for educational
or recreational purposes. The basic cases upholding such a fee are Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966), and
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 138 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). For a contrary view, see Kelber v. City of
Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (4th Dist. Calif. 1957); Haugen v.
Gleason, 266 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
15. Johnston, supra note 7, at 873 (emphasis in original).
16. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1157. 4
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Pennsylvania has enacted subdivision exaction enabling legislation,'
7 its
appellate courts have not yet set the constitutional boundaries for imple-
mentation of that legislation by local governmental units. This part of
the Comment, then, will attempt to determine the manner in which this
legislation deals with present and future issues involving subdivision exac-
tions. Hopefully, the recommendations offered regarding the manner in
which the enabling act should be construed or amended will facilitate the
development of a rational approach.
II. THE THRESHOLD PROBLEM: IDENTIFYING TI-E SCOPE OF
PERMISSIBLE POLICE POWER REGULATION AS IT
RELATES TO SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS
With the exception of a few early aberrations,'8 the first and most
basic challenge to any subdivision exaction, whether it be raised by the
subdivider, the homeowner-buyer, or the court itself, concerns the ability
of the municipality constitutionally to effectuate the exaction without just
compensation being paid therefor.19 Ultimately, the dispute reduces itself
to one of conflicting formulations of the state's police power to regulate in
the realms of public health, safety, and welfare, and its concomitant ability
to grant to municipalities, through enabling legislation, certain regulatory
prerogatives.
20
The police power has been described as "an inherent attribute of state
sovereignty, the plenary exercise of which rests in the discretion of state
legislatures."- 1 While exercise of the police power is theoretically confined
to those measures which directly promote public health, safety, and welfare,
22
in practice, courts tend to uphold the validity of its exercise so long as that
exercise is geared toward ends and accomplished by means which are
minimally rational. As one commentator has observed, "When the police
power is invoked as the impetus for legislative expression, the burden
cast upon the party arguing against its validity is a heavy one; classically,
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10501 et seq. (1972).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although this clause of the fifth amendment is applicable
only to the federal government, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
has been interpreted to impose this same prohibition upon the states. Appleby v.
Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524 (1911).
20. Should this hurdle be cleared, other issues may then spring forward. Treated
subsequently in this paper, for example, are the constitutional issues which may arise
as to the exclusionary potential of subdivision exactions (part III A), and the equal
protection problems which could surface when it is noted that exaction requirements
are generally levied only against housing developments, and not, for example, the
apartment complex which causes an influx of persons and a similar strain on the
municipality (part III B). See notes 136-46 and accompanying text infra.
21. Johnston, supra note 7, at 887, citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934). For a lucid explanation of the permissible scope of the police power as offered
by Mr. Justice Holmes, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1122. 5
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if the question be 'fairly debatable,' its exercise will be upheld."'23 Thus,
although the task of the judiciary has been to weigh the owner's right to
use land against the municipality's power to regulate and condition that
use, the scales employed are significantly tipped in the municipality's
favor. Moreover, both the nature of that being weighed and the significance
accorded divers factors are often muddled by the courts, making it difficult
to glean a predictable methodology from precedent, as suggested in the
following statement: "In the usual case .. . the balance struck between
[the interests involved] is obscured by a pronouncement that the decision
was reached by use of some unexplained 'reasonableness' test."
'24
Notwithstanding the important problems raised by the subdivision
exaction and the mire of legal theory in which the concept rests, neither
court nor commentator has adequately pinpointed and assessed the issues
and possible solutions which have been suggested.25 Hence, this Comment,
within this first section, has divided the field into its two logical parts:
the grounds upon which subdivision exactions have been challenged as
falling without the police power; and the rationales advanced to classify
the requirements as being within the police power.
A. The Challenges: Contentions that Subdivision Exactions are
Outside the Scope of Permissible Police Power Regulation
According to the traditional analysis of the constitutionality of police
power regulation, the specific regulation must have been enacted to further
permissible goals falling within the scope of the police power, and the
exercise of that regulation must be reasonable. 26 It can readily be observed
that subdivision exactions satisfy the first requirement. Street, school, and
recreational constructions that are financed by exactions certainly are in-
tended to promote the general health, safety, and welfare of the com-
23. Feldman, The Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions for Educational
Purposes, 76 DICK. L. REV. 651, 655 (1972).
24. Johnston, supra note 7, at 874.
25. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of this paper, the courts disagree
as to the proper characterization of the issues and solutions. Furthermore, there are
only a few commentators who have approached the problem. Both Johnston, supra
note 7, and Heyman and Gilhool, supra note 5, wrote their articles when there was
more of a need to speculate on the ways in which important cases decided in the
early and mid-1960's would be interpreted. Cases since that time have answered some
questions and raised others. Feldman, supra note 23, constructed his treatment of the
area solely with regard to dedications of land for educational purposes, basing his
thesis upon the expectation that the Supreme Court would overturn the property tax
as unconstitutional. Id. at 651. Other treatments are generally less-than-all-inclusive
and/or outdated. See, e.g., Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Com-
munity Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 370; Harvith, Subdivision
Dedication Requirements - Some Observations and an Alternative: A Special Tax
on Gain from Realty, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 474 (1969); Reps & Smith, Control of
Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405 (1963); Comment, Money Pay-
ment Requirements as Conditions to the Approval of Subdivision Maps: Analysis and
Prognosis, 9 VILL. L. REV. 294 (1964).
26. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 19.04, at 392. 6
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munity.27 However, it is in determining the reasonableness of the regu-
lation that the great controversy exists.
Although the question of the reasonableness of a particular regulation
has generally turned upon whether it is confiscatory, arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or constitutes a taking,28 according to some commentators, only the
latter two considerations appear applicable to subdivision exactions. 29
Unfortunately, the challenges to exactions made in the cases do not neatly
fall into either of these categories. There are elements of discrimination in
the form of specific application of the exaction to the subdivision, and ele-
ments of an uncompensated taking when the subdivider dedicates parcels
of his subdivision with no apparent benefit to himself.30 Consequently, it
would appear more helpful to characterize the attacks that have been made
upon subdivision exactions as arguments of unfairness designed to demon-
strate that the police power regulation is unreasonable.
The unfairness challenge usually is presented in two forms. As noted
previously, the asserted justification for the exaction is that the financial
responsibility for the provision of facilities and services should be placed
with those who created the need and, obviously, will most benefit by them.
Thus, one argument that the exaction is unreasonable is based upon the
contention that the need for additional services was not generated by the
influx of newcomers. This challenge is less forceful with regard to exactions
for streets, sewers, pavements, water systems, and the like because these
facilities are directly tied to the service requirements created by the sub-
division.3' However, if exactions are intended to finance projects which
27. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1130, 1134.
28. Id. at 1124. Heyman and Gilhool define these four factors in the following
manner: confiscation results when the landowner is left with no significant value in
his property after the imposition of the regulation; arbitrariness usually occurs when
the regulation is not rationally related to the permissible objectives sought; discrimi-
nation exists if those similarly situated are not treated equally. Taking, however, is
not easily defined, although it has been suggested that a regulation will be deemed
unreasonable as a taking if there is no "correlative benefit" to the landowner. Id.
at 1124-30.
29. For example, as a general statement, Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5,
opine that subdivision exactions generally do not raise the problems of confiscation
or arbitrariness, since the exactions are generally not severe enough to diminish
unduly the value of the property, and are usually tailored toward the meeting of some
goal related to the public health, safety, or welfare. Id. at 1130-34. This appears to
be true as a general rule, in that the problems raised most often focus upon a claim
that a subdivision newcomer is being charged more than his fair share for the need
he generated. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. However, since the date of
their article, at least one further issue has been raised, relating to the fact that most
ordinances do not so charge apartment complexes despite the influx of population
they cause. See Associated Home Bldrs. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
642-43, 484 P.2d 606, 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971). Further, in East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305
N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969), the court invalidated an exaction on the ground that
it was confiscatory in that it reduced the value of the developer's property approxi-
mately 40 per cent. Id. at 622-23, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 925-26. Since it is believed that
such issues may become increasingly important in the future, they are dealt with in
detail in section III of this Comment.
30. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1134.
31. "Judicial reaction uniformly has been that the imposition of street dedication
and improvement conditions does not constitute a taking." Heyman & Gilhool, supra
note 5, at 1132. The two cases which seem to have formed the foundation for this now
almost universally accepted position are Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34
[VOL. 19
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also may benefit the community at large, such as schools, parks, or play-
grounds, there is less reason to believe that the project was undertaken
solely in response to service the subdivision.3 2 Since the facilities or services
would have been provided regardless of the existence of the subdivision,
they should be financed out of general revenues. 3 3 As such, this challenge
may be analogized to special assessments, another form of contribution to
finance improvements.
Special assessments are taxes on specific properties deemed to be
specially benefitted by an improvement.3 4 In the words of one court:
All such assessments have one common element: they are for the
construction of local improvements that are appurtenant to specific
land and bring a benefit substantially more intense than is yielded to
the rest of the municipality. The benefit to the land must be actual,
physical and material and not merely speculative or conjectural. 35
Although the subdivision exaction is not considered a tax on property,36
its relation to the special assessment is clear: presumably, that which is
Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949), and Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich.
468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
32. This form of exaction has been subject to conflicting treatment from the
courts in recent years. See part II B of this Comment. Many courts have avoided
this problem where it is possible to interpret the enabling legislation so that the
municipality has no authority to require the exaction in dispute. In Haugen v. Gleason,
226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961), the court held that since fees collected as part of
the subdivision exaction would be used for the partial benefit of those not within the
subdivision, the exaction was a tax. Id. at 104-05, 359 P.2d at 111. By means of an
extremely literal interpretation of the ordinance in issue, the court held that "since
the ordinance contains nothing to relate the money, or its expenditure, to the land
being subdivided, the result is that the money will become part of the public funds
of the county or the school district, as the case may be." Id. at 105, 359 P.2d at 111.
Finding no authority in the statute for the municipality to charge the fee which,
as so characterized, was a tax, the court invalidated the ordinance. Id. The case
should be contrasted with Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d
673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966), wherein the court specifically upheld an ordinance which
placed such fees in a fund for use by the entire village, not just the subdivision. Id.
at 83, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
33. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961): Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 614-17, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447-48, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
34. See Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 125
N.W.2d 617 (1964). See generally Antieau, The Special Assessments of Municipal
Corporations, 35 MARQ. L. REV. 315 (1952).
35. Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 404 P.2d
453 (1965).
36. However, the exaction has sometimes been challenged as a nonuniform tax.
See note 33 supra. As one judge has noted, a charge which "could be used for the
acquisition and improvement of recreation and park lands for the village generally ...
would be in the nature of a tax and not a fee or assessment for special benefits .... 1"
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 89, 218 N.E.2d 673, 679, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955, 962 (1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). Agreement with this view was ex-
pressed by the majorities in Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 638,
318 P.2d 561, 566 (4th Dist. Calif. 1957), and Haugen v. Gleason, 266 Ore. 99, 104-05,
359 P.2d 108, 110-11 (1961). So classified, the charge would be illegal not only as
unauthorized under the enabling legislation, but as a nonuniform tax. On the problems
inherent in distinguishing as to when a charge is subject to such uniformity require-
ments, see Wanamaker v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 274 A.2d 524
(1971). For an analysis of the Wanamaker decision and its implications in Pennsyl-
vania, see also Note, Taxation - The Business Use and Occupancy Tax of Phila-




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 5 [1974], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss5/7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
permissible to finance through special assessments, due to the local impact
of the facility or service funded by the assessment, could also be financed
through subdivision exactions provided that there is statutory authorization
for either method.
a7
A second challenge to the exaction as an unreasonable police power
regulation considers the effect of the exaction rather than the reason for
it. Proponents of this position argue that while the service provided by
the municipality is not one of community-wide concern and thus should
not be financed by general revenues, the exaction is nevertheless unreason-
able because it will benefit other persons in addition to the subdivision resi-
dents. 38 While the contention comes close to restating the first challenge
- that an exaction is justifiable only insofar as it can be related to a need
uniquely created by the subdivision dweller - the distinction between the
two positions may be clarified by their respective deficiencies: the first
would militate against any exaction designed to remedy a need which the
total community created, while the second would ignore the cause of the
problem so long as the monies exacted were used solely to benefit the
subdivision residents who, along with the rest of the community, were
aggrieved.39 For example, adherents to the first position, while conceding
37. However, the courts have indicated that the converse is not necessarily true.
As will be demonstrated in part IIB of this Comment, some courts have upheld land
dedications and fees in lieu thereof for schools and recreational facilities. It is very
doubtful that these improvements could be financed by special assessments. See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
38. For example, in Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004,
209 N.Y.S.2d 729, af'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (S. Ct. 1962), the
court found a subdivision exaction system which placed fees charged in a fund for use
of the town in establishing recreational facilities constitutionally deficient, stating
that the money paid by the subdivision residents could be used "in any section of the
town at any time, and for any recreation purpose . . . not directly related to the
development of the subdivision." 25 Misc. 2d at 1008, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732. This hold-
ing was later overruled in New York by the Court of Appeals in Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
Similarly, in West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224
A.2d 1 (1966), the court believed that a subdivision fee charged on a per lot basis,
to be placed in a fund to be used for capital improvements in the township's educational
system, was inherently discriminatory. Id. at 125, 224 A.2d at 3-4. This conclusion
was based upon the fact that the vacant land on which the subdivision was placed
had previously borne its taxation share of educational costs, and was now being
charged specially. The court reacted to the fact that the subdivision exactions would
be used for schools to be attended by those throughout the township and not just
by those in the subdivision, stating "there would be an imbalance if new construction
alone were to bear the capital costs of new schools, while also being charged with
the capital costs of schools serving other portions of the school district." Id. at 126-27,
224 A.2d at 4. Other courts have disagreed that such would constitute unfairness to
the point of illegality. See notes 0-135 and accompanying text infra. In any event,
the problem may be solved by the employment of modern cost accounting techniques.
See note 175 in! ra.
39. See Associated Home Bldrs. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). The court char-
acterized this contention as follows:
[E]ven if it be conceded that no showing of a direct relationship between a par-
ticular subdivision and an increase in the community's recreational needs is re-
quired, nevertheless the subdivider cannot be compelled to dedicate land for such
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that their numbers contributed to a school overcrowding problem, would
reject a subdivision exaction tailored to remedy the matter, contending
that the solution was a "public" responsibility. Adherents to the second
position, while conceding their role in creating school overcrowding, would
accept a subdivision charge only to the extent that it would be specifically
channelled into remedying that portion of the overcrowding which the
subdivision actually caused - that is, the exactions could be used to provide
school space only for the children of the subdivision. 40
One additional challenge that has appeared has been one questioning
the method by which the exaction amount is calculated. In other words, the
complaint may be that what is exacted bears no relation in amount to the
expenditures which the subdivision will cause the exacting municipality to
make. This is especially true of uniform per lot or percentage-of-land-area
exactions. For instance, where existing recreational facilities might be
adequate to cope with an increased population without added improvement
in one area, while in another, full scale recreational construction would be
needed, a uniform exaction clearly would be unrelated to the needs created
by the particular subdivision. 41 However, a majority of courts have vali-
dated uniform per lot or percentage-of-land-area exactions, finding a
needs, or pay a fee, unless his contribution will necessarily and primarily benefit
the particular subdivision.
4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
Similarly, in Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004,
209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962),
the Supreme Court in Orange County, New York, invalidated a fee exaction collected
from particular subdivisions within a town, on the ground that the monies thereby
collected were "available for use by the town for neighborhood park, playground or
recreation purposes" and thus were "not necessarily, if at all, for the benefit of future
residents of the area covered by the plat .... The charge is made for the benefit of
the town as a whole." 25 Misc. 2d at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
40. It should again be noted that many state enabling statutes and many local
ordinances authorize not only land dedications and improvement construction, but also
fees paid in lieu thereof. See, e.g., N.Y. TowN LAW § 277, f 1 (McKinney 1965).
Most commonly, the fees are paid if the municipality determines that the land dedica-
tion would be undesirable, as in the case where a subdivision is too small in area to
warrant taking a portion of the land for park purposes - the park would simply
be too small to be practical. In jurisdictions which adhere to the position that sub-
division exactions must be used for the benefit of the subdivision residents charged,
this invariably raises problems: since the fees are put to use in constructing, for
example, recreational facilities outside of the subdivision itself (note that if the land
were available for such construction within the subdivision, a land dedication would
have been required instead), it is difficult to prove that the recreational facilities
provided will benefit the subdivision uniquely. The most oft-cited example of such
analysis is Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d
729 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
41. See, e.g., Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910
(1970). The court invalidated an exaction ordinance which required all subdivisions
to dedicate seven per cent of their total land for recreational purposes, labelling it"clearly arbitrary on its face." Id. at 71, 264 A.2d at 914. Apparently, the court
reacted to the fact that a set percentage applied to all subdivisions without regard
to the individual circumstances could not be tailored to defray the specific expenses
which particular subdivisions would necessitate incurring.
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sufficiently reasonable nexus between such a scheme and the expense which
the municipality will have to absorb.
42
Admittedly, these challenges to subdivision exactions may not reflect
traditional legal theory concerning what is a valid police power regulation,
Nevertheless, they represent the types of questions which have been posed
to the courts who have considered the issues. As a result, an appreciation
of the distinctions between the challenges will aid in formulating a rational
approach to the judicial responses.
B. The Judicial Responses: The Criteria Employed in Constitutionally
Evaluating Subdivision Exactions as Police Power Regulations
Restating the basic issue, the courts have had to delineate the cir-
cumstances in which a municipality under proper state authorization can
compel a subdivider to "donate" to the governmental unit his land, his
services, and/or his money. The subdivider and the homeowner-buyer
complain because such conditions to the approval of the project raise the
selling price; many judges complain of what they deem an affront to their
senses of fairness. But, more often than not, the municipality states a
tenable position: increased population causes increased expenses. The
question becomes one of who should pay. The response evoked has de-
pended largely upon which of the variety of tests constructed is applied
to the particular situation.
The evolution of these constitutional tests is a curious example of the
dangers inherent in the failure properly to credit the importance of cir-
cumstances in which particular cases were decided. After ruling out the
obvious constitutional infirmities of confiscation, arbitrariness, and dis-
crimination, 43 analysis of the relevant cases must progress with an eye
upon three objective factors, already highlighted, which often serve to
distinguish fundamentally the approaches the courts have taken.
First, all valid municipal subdivision exactions are functions of state
enabling statutes. The extent to which the state legislature appears to
favor the exaction process may significantly influence the degree of latitude
a court will afford a municipality in the enforcement of particular exaction
ordinances.44 Second, the type of exaction involved is significant. An
exaction ordinance or an enabling statute might provide only for streets,
sewers, and other improvements which are physically located within the
subdivision itself. Courts have generally upheld such exactions because
42. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966), wherein the court approved a $120
per lot exaction for school purposes, speaking of the need only to "reasonably estab-
lish" the nexus of that charged to that need generated by the subdivision. 28 Wis.
2d at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 447. One commentator concludes that Jordan offered "the
most consistent workable rationale." Johnston, supra note 5, at 924. For an examina-
tion of the implications of Jordan, see notes 114-35 and accompanying text infra.
43. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
44. For a discussion of the Billings Properties case, an opinion focusing primarily
on this factor, see notes 97-102 and accompanying text infra.
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these improvements can be directly related to the needs caused by the sub-
division residents, and because they serve only those residents. 45 However,
those subdivision exactions that require dedication of land for recreational
or school purposes raise distinct legal problems and merit separate treat-
mentY' Third, certain ordinances and enabling statutes allow the mu-
nicipality to exact a fee in lieu of land dedication, and again, despite its
general classification as a "subdivision exaction," this device must be
separated from the others so termed.4 7 It is submitted that these three
factors serve to reconcile seemingly inconsistent cases, and to distinguish
seemingly compatible decisions; as such, these factors must be kept in
mind as one scrutinizes the approaches that courts have taken in this area.
1. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles :48 The "Benefit
to the Subdivider" Test
Through the 192 0's and 1930's, courts faced with constitutional chal-
lenges to subdivision exactions seemed content to validate them through
general statements of their service to the public health, safety, or welfare.
In large measure, this was due to the fact that the usual requirement exacted
only the construction and dedication of streets within the subdivision itself.49
When faced with more, courts seemed to strain to avoid confronting the
basic issue of whether the municipality should be forced to pay for what
it required.
A good example is the 1928 case of Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of
Detroit.50 In that case, the Supreme Court of Michigan examined an
exaction ordinance which required the subdivider to conform to the city's
general plan5' which indicated the city's desire to widen a street which
bordered one side of the subdivider's tract. As a result, the city required
the subdivider to dedicate a strip of land which abutted that street.5 2 It
was clear that the required dedication was not necessitated by the sub-
division, since the city had planned to widen the road even before the
subdivision's existence. Moreover, it would not primarily serve the develop-
ment, since it was an exterior, rather than interior, route. The court was
content, however, to dispose of the issue by observing that since the streets
of Detroit were built for "the horse and buggy age," the widening require-
ment was "necessary for the public safety."'5 3 Realizing, perhaps, that no
one could dispute the wisdom of providing safe streets, and realizing
further that the observation did not settle the issue of who should fund
45. See note 32 stupra.
46. See note 33 supra.
47. See notes 33, 36 & 38 supra.
48. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
49. See Reps & Smith, supra note 25, at 410 and the cases cited therein.
50. 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
51. The general plan set out mandatory width, drainage, and pavement specifica-
tions for certain types of streets. Id. at 469, 217 N.W. at 58-59.
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the project, the Ridgefield court invoked a fiction: "In theory, at least,
the owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets
in return for the advantage and privilege of having his plat recorded."5 4
Since according to the city charter the subdivider could not sell his land in
separate tracts without preliminary approval, construing his dedication as
"voluntary" was, euphemistically, an indulgence on the part of the court. 55
In Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court of
California faced a similar issue, but chose a more realistic tack. The
plaintiff-subdivider appealed the denial of a mandamus action against the
City Council of Los Angeles to compel the approval of his plat. By this
time, it was widely conceded that a municipality could constitutionally
require the subdivider to provide internal service roads, 50 and thus the
plaintiff challenged the exaction of four other requirements: 1) the dedi-
cation of a 10-foot strip of land to be used for the widening of a bordering
street, similar to that required by Detroit in Ridgefield; 2) the condition
that the subdivider not only reserve a 10-foot wide strip of land within the
subdivision which bordered the street as it would eventually be widened,
but also plant shrubbery thereon so as to shield the contiguous homes from
traffic; 3) the extension of a street through the subdivision to a width
within the subdivision of 80 feet, instead of 60 feet as the plaintiff had
originally planned (which width was the dimension of the street as it
existed outside of the subdivision) ; 4) the dedication of a small parcel
of the land whereon several roads converged, for the purposes of traffic
safety.57 The court validated all of the exactions.58
In so doing, the court began with the tacit assumption that in any
event the subdivider would have to provide the internal streets of the
development.5 9 What made this assumption crucial to the result in Ayres
was the observation that Los Angeles, as a matter of city planning policy,
required the subdivision to be laid out in a manner which produced a sig-
nificant reduction in street provision costs for the developer. The design
which was termed "cellular" reduced the amount which the subdivider
would otherwise be required to dedicate. 60 The court noted this benefit
to the subdivider and continued as follows:
The petitioner and the lot owners in the subdivision will participate
in these benefits and savings by the selection and adherence to the
particular design. In fact the petitioner makes no objection to that
design as such. It is to be assumed that he prefers it with the resulting
54. Id.
55. See note 7 supra.
56. 34 Cal. 2d at 37, 207 P.2d at 8.
57. Id. at 34-35, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
58. Id. at 34-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
59. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
60. By this plan, the rear areas of all residential lots abutted the principal
thoroughfares, thereby relieving the developer of the burden of dedicating his land
for street construction. The effect of such planning was to create residential "cells"
attached to, but not fronting on, heavily traveled highways. See 34 Cal. 2d at 33-34,
207 P.2d at 2-3. Consequently, the developer was not forced to dedicate land in order
to provide access for the lots.
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savings in land and cost. But he seeks in addition compensation for
the fulfillment of the conditions which make this type of lot subdivision
feasible . . . . The conclusion is justifiable that the widening and
planting strips and the elimination of the hazardous tip are as much a
part of the design and improvement within the proposed subdivision
as would the lateral and transverse service roads and lanes had the
regular or non-cellular design been selected.6 '
The reasoning of the court should be considered in view of the highly sig-
nificant conclusion in Ayres that "it is no defense to the conditions imposed
in a subdivision map proceeding that that their fulfillment will incidentally
also benefit the city as a whole."
' 2
The Ayres test justifies a subdivision exaction as a police power
regulation through a stress not only on the reasonableness of the require-
ment in terms of public health, safety, and welfare as the courts in prior
cases had done, 63 but also on the financial benefit that the exaction, in the
long run, accords to the subdivider and thus to the homeowner within the
subdivision. In this respect, the Ayres standard closely resembles that
used to determine the validity of special assessments. 64
2. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect:65 The
"Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Test
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect also
involved a mandamus proceeding to compel a subdivision plat approval.
The Illinois subdivision exaction enabling statute allowed municipalities
to enforce "reasonable" requirements designed to promote the development
of parks and playgrounds.6 Consequently, the defendant village required
a subdivision land dedication for recreational purposes of 1 acre per 60
families.67 Purporting to rely upon Ayres, the Supreme Court of Illinois
posited a constitutional standard for the subdivision exaction in issue:
[I]f the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely
attributable to his [the subdivider's] activity, then the requirement is
permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of
private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions
rather than reasonable regulation under the police power." 8
Concluding that the overcrowding problem which the village experienced
was the result of the "total development of the community," the court held
61. Id. at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6.
62. Id. at 41, 207 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added).
63. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
64. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
65. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
66. Law of July 21, 1959, ch. 24, §§ 53-2 to -3, [1959] Ill. Laws 1651 (repealed
1961).
67. 22 Ill. 2d at 377, 176 N.E.2d at 801.
68. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
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that the "specifically and uniquely attributable" criteria had not been met,
and invalidated the ordinance.6 9
The Pioneer Trust test, put forth in 1961, has survived in form, if not
in substance. The words have been echoed frequently, although their strict
application by the Pioneer Trust court has not always been duplicated.
70
It is submitted, however, that the test was born of an unparalleled mis-
reading of the Ayres opinion. At no time did Ayres endorse a constitutional
standard which required the finding of an unassailable link between the
need for the exaction and the creation of the subdivision. In fact, much of
that required of the subdivider in Ayres had been planned by the city
to be funded with municipal revenues before the subdivision was even
so much as contemplated.7 It should be remembered that the Ayres court
found no problem in observing that the exaction with which they dealt
might also benefit the entire community, so long as the subdivision also
retained an advantage from its imposition. It apparently follows that, if
the exaction alleviates problems in the surrounding community, the sur-
rounding community must have had a role in the creation of the problems
which the exaction was designed to remedy. Hence, the test as stated in
Pioneer Trust finds no support in Ayres.
One commentator has attacked the Pioneer Trust reasoning on a
second ground, contending that the overcrowding problem present in
Pioneer Trust was in fact "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
subdivision so the court failed to correctly apply its own test.72 The court
noted that before the subdivision was created, existing facilities had reached
their respective capacities.7 3 Thus the need for more facilities could be
traced to the subdivision - in other words, what existed was adequate,
so long as there were no population increases.74 This contention, however,
seems to ignore the fact that the converse is also true: had it not been
for the total growth of the community, existing facilities in the village
would not have reached their capacities. Even if the population had in-
creased, without that total growth the facilities would have been able to
absorb the additional strain caused by a migration of new residents into
the area. Therefore, the need for new facilities was not "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the subdivision. In any event, Pioneer Trust
conceived a test which was difficult to pass, and placed a severe burden upon
the exacting municipality.
69. Id. at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
70. See notes 97-107 and accompanying text infra.
71. The city in Ayres had had the street-widening in issue platted on its official
map before the subdivision was submitted for approval. 207 P.2d at 5-6.
72. In the words of Johnston, supra note 7:
Pioneer Trust seems erroneous both in its adoption of an unduly restrictive
standard of reasonableness not justified by the supporting authority, and in its
misapplication of that test to one of the few factual situations which ought to
satisfy it.
Id. at 909.
73. 22 I11. 2d at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
74. Johnston, supra note 7, at 909.
796 [VOL. 19
15
Trachtman: Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
MAY 1974]
3. Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh :75 The "Direct Benefit
to the Subdivision" Test
If Ayres' insistence that there must be shown some benefit passing
to the subdivision were combined with Pioneer Trust's emphasis on the
establishment of a direct causal link between the exaction and the need
which demanded that remedy, the hybrid result might be a test which
required the showing of a direct and primary benefit accruing to the sub-
division from the exaction. One year after the Pioneer Trust decision, such
a hybrid was spawned by the Supreme Court of New York's Orange
County, in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh. An ordinance,
validly enacted under the enabling legislation, allowed the municipality
to charge fees in lieu of land dedications for recreational purposes.76 The
court reasoned that since the grant of power by the state legislature was
"not necessarily, if at all, for the benefit of future residents of the area
covered by the plat ... the charge is made for the benefit of the town as a
whole."'77 Furthermore, the money could be used "in any section of the
town at any time and for any recreation purpose . . . not directly related
to the development of the subdivision. It may be spent before the develop-
ment of the subdivision is undertaken or completed.178 The precise facts
upon which the Gulest court relied are unclear, but commentators seem to
agree that the holding stands for the proposition that "no scheme for cash
payments in lieu of dedication is valid unless the funds must be expended
in such a way as to confer a direct benefit upon the subdivision."7 9
That position was clarified in Justice Van Voorhis' dissent in Jenad,
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,80 decided four years after Gulest. Chief Judge
Desmond purported to overrule Gulest in the majority opinion in Jenad,
but did so only insofar as Gulest found the town ordinance involved vague,
a ground which seemed to be merely secondary to the Gulest court's
holding. Chief Judge Desmond's language seems inclusive enough, how-
ever, to mark the demise of the direct benefit test in New York:
Even if the Gulest decision were correct [with respect to vagueness
of the Town Law] - and we hold it is not - it would not apply
here since by the Scarsdale rules and regulations the monies collected
75. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 815,
225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
76. As the court characterized the problem, quoting the enabling statute:
The basic issue is then whether the Legislature may constitutionally provide for
the payment of money as a condition to approval of a subdivision plat in an amount
to be determined by the Town Board "which amount shall be available for use by
the town for neighborhood park, playground or recreation purposes including the
acquisition of property."
25 Misc. 2d at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732, quoting N.Y. ToWN LAW § 271(1)
(McKinney 1965) (emphasis supplied by the court).
77. 25 Misc. 2d at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
78. Id.
79. Johnston, supra note 7, at 911. E.g.: "The Gulest court would prohibit
exactions unless they result in facilities which directly benefit the subdivision to which
they are related." Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1136 (emphasis in original).
80. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
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as "in lieu" fees are not only put into a "separate fund to be used
for park, playground and recreational purposes" . . . but, as provided
by the board of trustees, expenditures from such fund are to be made
only for "acquisition and improvement of recreation and park lands"
in the village. There is nothing vague about that language.8l
Quite clearly, Gulest invalidated the ordinance on the ground that it could
be used by the town for purposes other than those which would directly
benefit the subdivision. The Jenad majority validated the ordinance pre-
sented therein on the basis of the observation that it was not vague pre-
cisely because it went into a fund which, as in Gulest, could be used for
development of recreational areas not primarily serving the subdivision.
Without citing Gulest specifically, Justice Van Voorhis, in dissent, pin-
pointed the problem in such an arrangement and thus highlighted what
appears to have been in the minds of the Gulest majority:
No one contends that this park and recreation fund of the Village of
Scarsdale is for the special benefit of this real estate tract; it can be
expended only for the benefit of the village as a whole yet every lot
in every new tract is required to be assessed at $250. . . . whether
the lot is worth $2000. or $25,000, or whether the size is two acres or
half an acre, and regardless of where it is located in the village or
whether it will ever receive any benefit from some general village
project not yet conceived.8
2
As a result of this failure to tie the exaction to a specific benefit to be
conferred on the subject of the exaction, Justice Van Voorhis concluded
that "the exaction would be in the nature of a tax and not a fee or
assessment for special benefit," thereby implying that the constitutional
test by which to measure such exactions was one which relied upon the
distinction between special and general benefits in special assessment
cases.
83
Despite the Jenad court's unfavorable view of it, the Gulest direct
benefit approach has been supported by commentators. One article8 4 ad-
vances the opinion that it is the most constitutionally sound test for three
reasons: first, the authors contend that a subdivision dedication, improve-
ment, or fee requirement is a "positive exaction," as opposed to a police
power regulation in the nature of a zoning restriction, a "negative pro-
hibition." As such, it involves a more severe burden, and should thus be
judicially regulated according to the Gulest and Pioneer Trust require-
ments.8 5 Second, they argue, a subdivision exaction which results in a
public benefit requires the subdivision owners to pay more than their
81. Id. at 82-83, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957-58.
82. Id. at 88-89, 218 N.E.2d at 678, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 961 (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 89, 218 N.E.2d at 679, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra. The direct benefit theory continues to
be asserted in other jurisdictions, although with little success. See, e.g., Associated
Home Bldrs. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 640, 484 P.2d 606-11, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 635, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 787 (1971).
84. Reps & Smith, supra note 25.
85. Id. at 407.
[VOL. 19
17
Trachtman: Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
MAY 1974]
proportionate share of the improvement; at least part of the cost should
be shared by the surrounding community. s6 Finally, the writers insist that
what it is impermissible to fund by special assessment is similarly imper-
missible to fund by subdivision exaction. The specific reference is to
schools, which these authors construe to be so much a part of the public
responsibility that private charges therefor are unconstitutional, lest there
develop a tuition system in community educational schemes.8 7
Other authorsss contend that these positions are unsound. As to the
first, they argue that the distinction between a "positive exaction" and
"negative prohibition" is not illuminating, since, in some circumstances,
the former may be less burdensome than the latter. The convincing example
they offer is the situation wherein a plat of land in an area commercially
promising is residentially zoned. As between this and subdivision exactions,
these authors seem justified in concluding that "[e]ither, neither, or both
can be discriminatory or takings in any specific case."8 9 As to the second
rationale, they contend that it is possible to apply a cost analysis to cure
this purported defect.90 In addition, they reiterate the oft-cited statement
in Ayres to the effect that an incidental public benefit resulting from the
exaction is not constitutionally impermissible so long as there is some other
palpable justification for the exaction as applied.91 Finally, with regard to
the fear of a development of tuition-like systems in the public schools,
these commentators note that a similar situation presently exists, since
different communities set tax rates of differing amounts which equalization
programs would mitigate only to inconsequential degrees. Thus, the fear
that persons will be unable to move into a particular area due to its high
cost of education may have already materialized. 92
4. The Offshoots: The Attempts to Apply Conflicting
Constitutional Criteria
As the constitutionality of requiring internal subdivision improvements
became settled,92 the issue which rose to the forefront of the dispute
86. Id. at 409.
87. Id. at 410, citing Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison Twp., 68 N.J. Super.
197, 209, 172 A2d 40, 47.
88. E.g., Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5.
89. Id. at 1137.
90. Id. at 1141-46.
91. Id. at 1137-38.
92. Id. at 1140-41. The questions raised by the use of diverse cost accounting
methods are indeed numerous and complex. Since this Comment is concerned with
the general legal issues raised by subdivision exactions, rather than the practical
aspects of their application, which, however, are related to the legal problems, no
position is taken upon nor an extensive discussion provided regarding these questions.
93. See note 32 supra. There were very few cases which challenged the validity
of this type of exaction after Pioneer Trust and Gulest. Of late, they have come up
in rather unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Baker v. Planning Bd. of Framingham,
353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E.2d 831 (1967), where the subdivider challenged the planning
board's imposition of a water drainage system on his land. The subdivider had agreed
to provide a system which would meet the needs of his subdivision but deprive the
surrounding area of a water retention capability which the subdivider's land, whenvacant, provided. Id. at 142-43, 228 N.E.2d at 832. The court, in reversing the plan-
COMMENT
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 5 [1974], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss5/7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
involved the constitutionality of requiring land dedications or equalization
fees in lieu thereof for the purpose of providing for the expansion of the
municipality's school or recreational system. It should be noted that Ayres
involved an exaction requiring land dedication largely for traffic safety
purposes and, although the Ayres court did not specifically limit its analysis
to such a situation, it was not clear whether it could be extended beyond
its facts to exactions for educational or recreational purposes. The potential
extension of the less stringent Ayres test is dubious in light of the fact that
Pioneer Trust and Gulest were decided with reference to land dedication
for recreation and school purposes, and fees in lieu thereof, respectively.
As one commentator noted, "Pioneer Trust and Gulest seemed to confirm
the emergence of highly restrictive standards for the validity of exactions
for recreation and educational purposes . . . . 4 This restrictiveness, how-
ever, became difficult to rationalize with the courts' views of zoning ordi-
nances as presumptively valid.9 5 Consequently, courts were by no means
clearly convinced that, legally or practically, subdivision exaction require-
ments for these purposes warranted the imposition of significant barriers
to their validation.
In this context, the attempts to escape from Pioneer Trust and Gulest
began. For reasons not altogether clear, the vast majority of attempts
concerned themselves with a circumvention of Pioneer Trust's "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test - Gulest was generally ignored. 96
A good example of these escape attempts is Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County,9 7 where the Supreme Court of Montana examined an
enabling statute, indistinguishable in any material way from the enabling
legislation in Pioneer Trust,98 authorizing municipalities to require sub-
ning board's denial of his application for plat approval, reasoned that the subdivider's
obligation only went so far as reasonably to provide for the needs of his subdivision.
Id. at 144-45, 228 N.E.2d at 833. See also Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 55
N.J. 546, 262 A.2d 857 (1970), wherein the court invalidated an exaction which would
require the subdivider to reserve a 50-foot right of way for the extension of a road
through his subdivision. The right of way would comprise 20 per cent of the total
area of the rather small development, and was in no way necessary to service the
subdivision residents. Id. at 468, 262 A.2d at 863.
94. Johnston, supra note 7, at 911.
95. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 2.14, at 67. See also Johnston, supra
note 7, at 911. As a result of this disparity, "commentators were driven to rather
tenuous reasoning in the attempt to harmonize this new rationale with conventional
zoning and subdivision control doctrine." Id. In so stating, Johnston referred to the
Reps & Smith arguments in favor of the Gulest analysis (see notes 84-87 and
accompanying text supra), and manifested his approval of the Heyman & Gilhool
rebuttal (see notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra). Johnston, supra note 7,
at 911-12, 912 n.189.
96. This may be due in part to the simple fact that Pioneer Trust was decided
before Gulest, and thus was adopted in most jurisdictions before Gulest was decided.
Further, the chances of Gulest's displacing Pioneer Trust diminished as of 1966,
when the Court of Appeals of New York - the state in which Gulest was originally
decided - cast significant doubt upon the validity of the "direct benefit" analysis in
Jenad. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra. This is, however, speculation.
No court or commentator has offered such an explanation.
97. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
98. As Johnston noted, "Billings Properties cannot be harmonized with Pioneer
Trust by distinguishing the two statutes. The conflict in the cases stems from the
antithetical views of the respective courts." Johnston, supra note 7, at 914.
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dividers to dedicate land for parks or playgrounds. 99 Purporting to accept
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" criteria, 100 the court disposed
of the issue in a curious fashion. Since the legislature allowed municipalities
to require such a dedication, the court held that "the question of whether
or not the subdivision created the need for a park . .. is one that has
already been answered by our Legislature." 'u With the utmost judicial
deference to the legislature - engaging in no factual analysis of any sub-
stance whatsoever - the court avoided the constitutional issues which
continued to perplex other tribunals. In deferring to legislative judgment
with regard to a specific issue which the legislature had not considered -
whether this particular exaction was justifiable - the Billings court avoided
the restrictiveness of Pioneer Trust, and instead established a nearly irre-
butable presumption in favor of an exaction's validity.
1 2
Other courts accomplished similar results through bald assertions that
the Pioneer Trust test had been met, without so much as an illusory
explanation such as that offered in Billings. For example, in Aunt Hack
Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission,1 0 3 the Supreme Court of
Connecticut dealt with a statute-0 4 similar to those in issue in Pioneer Trust
and Billings, stating:
In these days of burgeoning populations, critical housing problems, and
the incentive which they create for the activity of land developers, the
need for parks, recreational areas and open space for the welfare of the
people looms large. Planning commission recommendations for recre-
ational purposes, for controlling the density of population and for
parks and playgrounds would be of little value if, as open spaces are
built upon, reasonable provision to accomplish these purposes could
not be required. 10 5
Of course, this is no response to the basic question of determining for what
the municipality should be required to pay while it pursues the effectuation
of those noble goals. The court thus continued:
The fact that the exercise of the police power prevents the enjoyment
of certain individual rights in property without providing compensa-
tion therefor does not necessarily constitute a taking of the property
without just compensation . . . .The test which has been generally
applied in determining whether a requirement that a developer set
aside land for parks and playgrounds [is a taking] .. . is whether
the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely at-
tributable to his own activity . . . . It is clear that the requirement
99. Sec. 1, L. 1883, 39 (codified at MONT. RV. CODES, ANN. § 11-602 (1968))
(repealed 1973).
100. 144 Mont. at 33, 394 P.2d at 187, citing Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village
of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
101. Id. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.
102. In the words of Johnston, supra note 7, "Just as Pioneer Trust formulated
an almost unattainable standard of validity for this type of exaction, Billings Properties
established a virtually unassailable presumption in its favor." Id. at 914.
103. 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-25 (1958), as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-25 (Supp. 1974).
105. 160 Conn. at 113-14, 273 A.2d at 883.
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which is cast upon the plaintiff ... is uniquely and solely attributable
to its activity in undertaking to establish a subdivision. 06
Therefore, applying the Pioneer Trust test to the Pioneer Trust facts, the
court reached a result opposite to that in Pioneer Trust, neither explaining
the conflict nor so much as noting its existence. The court did, however,
add what appeared to be a caveat to its holding: "Moreover, when it chooses
to subdivide the land, the open space requirement renders the lots offered
for sale more attractive and desireable to purchasers, a circumstance of
value to the seller.' 10 7 Clearly, the Aunt Hack court was applying Ayres'
"benefit to the subdivider" logic to reach a result consistent with a supposed
Pioneer Trust analysis. The escape from the rigid strictures of Pioneer
Trust could not be more apparent.
C. The Future: The Move to Abandon the Past in Favor of a
"Rational Nexus" Test
Although the escapes from the unwanted invalidations, which would
seem to follow from the standardized constitutional tests, were successful
in result, they imposed a methodology characterized more by folly than by
precision. The grounds for decision were manifestly unclear. Billings and
Aunt Hack serve to demonstrate that tendency since they are virtually
indistinguishable from Pioneer Trust except in their results. Thus, if
these cases prove nothing else, they prove the existence of a need to dis-
regard the lipservice paid to tests no longer adhered to and embark upon
the establishment of definitive signposts to guide the resolution of future
conflicts of a similar genre.
The California Supreme Court seems to have provided some impetus
in that general direction. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut
Creek,'08 the court affirmed the constitutionality of the state enabling legis-
lation which allowed municipalities to require subdividers to dedicate land,
or contribute fees in lieu thereof, for park or recreation development in the
area in which the subdivision was located, with the stipulation that "the
amount and location of land to be dedicated or fees to be paid shall bear a
reasonable relationship to the use of the park and recreational facilities by
the future inhabitants of the subdivsion. ' 1°9 Pursuant to the enabling
statute, the city had enacted an ordinance that required a dedication fixed
by the type of residence and the number of future occupants, which, in the
instant case, was 2 acres per 1,000 residents or an equivalent fee which
was to be in an amount equal to the value of the land which would other-
106. Id. at 117-18, 273 A.2d at 884-85 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 119, 273 A.2d at 885.
108. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S..
878 (1971).
109. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11546 (West Supp. 1974).
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wise be dedicated under the applicable formula." 0 The plaintiff subdivider
challenged the statute and the ordinance on several constitutional bases.
Most significantly, the subdivider specifically invoked the reasoning
of Pioneer Trust,"' and thus forced the court to dispose of the contention
by confronting it, rather than by avoiding it. As the court characterized
his argument, the subdivider would suffer a taking without just compensa-
tion should his land be taken for park or recreation purposes, since such
facilities are required by the presence of all citizens."
2
To dispose of this Pioneer Trust reasoning, the court turned specific-
ally to its previous decision in Ayres, despite the fact that Ayres was
decided in a context of land dedication for traffic safety purposes. The
court held that "we do not find in Ayres support for the principle urged by
Associated that a dedication requirement may be upheld only if the par-
ticular subdivision creates the need for the dedication."" 3 As a result,
the court chose, in a footnote, to explicitly reject the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test, making it one of the few to clearly break with
the past."
4
Although it could have treated the Pioneer Trust contention by re-
ferring to the statutory language requiring only a "reasonable relationship"
between the exaction and the subdivision, the Associated court specifically
chose to rejuvenate Ayres. In so doing, the opinion appears correct, since
the enabling statute called for such a link between the exaction and the use
by future inhabitants of that to which the exaction is applied. As such,
the statutory language appeared more tailored to the disposal of a Gulest
contention 1 5 and, in fact, the court dismissed the subdivider's contention
that the exaction was unconstitutional unless used to "necessarily and
primarily benefit the particular subdivision" on that ground.116 However,
the court, in what might be construed as dicta, reaffirmed one of the bases
of the Ayres holding, positing that it is no defense to the conditions imposed
in a subdivision map proceeding that "their fulfillment will incidentally also
benefit the city as a whole."" 7 In addition, the Associated court noted the
110. WALNUT CREEK CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1, 516, cited in 4 Cal. 3d at
636-37, 484 P.2d at 608-09, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
111. 4 Cal. 3d at 647, 484 P.2d at 612-13, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37, citing Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
112. The court stated:
Thus, it is asserted, the future residents of the subdivision, who will ultimately
bear the burden imposed on the subdivider, will be required to pay for recreational
facilities the need for which stems not from the development of any one subdivision
but from the needs of the community as a whole.
In order to avoid these constitutional pitfalls, claims Associated, a dedication
requirement is justified only if it can be shown that the need for additional park
and recreational facilities is attributable to the increase in population stimulated
by the new subdivision alone and the validity of the section may not be upheld
upon the theory that all subdivisions to be built in the future will create the need
for such facilities.
4 Cal. 3d at 638-39, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (emphasis added).
113. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
114. Id. at 644 n.3, 484 P.2d at 615 n.3, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.3.
115. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
116. 4 Cal. 3d at 640, 484 P.2d at 611-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
117. Id. at 639, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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importance of the benefit to the subdivider which passed as a result of
the subdivision approval, thus echoing another Ayres theme." s
Associated provides a statement of California's disagreement with the
Pioneer Trust requirement that a subdivision exaction be tied to a need
created solely by the subdivision. The extent to which the case can be
followed depends upon the willingness of other state courts who have
followed Pioneer Trust, at least in form, to break with precedent. Unfortu-
nately, there are factors in the Associated case which may provide a basis
for other courts to distinguish it as a matter of course, should they be so
inclined. First, the Associated court interpreted an enabling statute which,
even in its most narrow construction, hinted at the legislature's desire to
depart from any rigid constitutional test of subdivision exactions for
recreational purposes. Second, the state of California had as precedent the
Ayres decision, which made original adoption of a new test by this court
unnecessary. Other courts could not make the same claim, especially if
they had previously adopted the Pioneer Trust test. This should be the
lesson of Billings and Aunt Hack.
For this reason, it is submitted that the 1966 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls' 9 will be of
the greatest influence in determining the evolution of constitutional doc-
trine in the area of subdivision exactions for educational and recreational
purposes. In Jordan, the plaintiff subdivider sued the village for recovery
of an equalization fee paid in lieu of a land dedication for the expansion
of schools and parks.120  The Wisconsin enabling legislation provided a
general grant of authority to municipalities to condition the approval of
subdivision plats. 1' 1 It contained no specific grant of authority to require
land dedications or fees in lieu thereof, but did specifically state the legis-
lative intent that it be construed liberally in favor of the municipalities to
which it applied. 122 The court initially faced the question of whether the
exaction was permissible under the act. Reasoning that subdivision ex-
actions were universally allowed for such improvements as streets and
water systems and taking note of the requirement that the act be construed
liberally, the court upheld the ordinance as authorized by the enabling
legislation.
123
118. As the court construed the theory, since "the subdivider realizes a profit from
governmental approval of a subdivision since his land is rendered more valuable by
the fact of subdivision and in return for this benefit the city may require him to dedi-
cate a portion of his land for park purposes .... " Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 615, 94
Cal. Rptr. at 639.
119. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
120. 28 Wis. 2d at 612, 137 N.W.2d at 443-44.
121. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.45 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.45
(Supp. 1974).
122. Id. § 236.45(1).
123. The court also reasoned from Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d
100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960), wherein it had previously upheld an exaction requiring
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The court then faced the subdivider's contention that the dedication
was "an unconstitutional taking of private property for public purpose.
' u2 4
Without the assistance of explicit legislative intent or a Wisconsin prece-
dent, the Jordan court redefined the Pioneer Trust test, adopted the reason-
ing of Ayres, and attempted to clarify the proportions of their approach for
use in the future. Under the court's reasoning Pioneer Trust was approved,
provided the words "specifically and uniquely attributable to [the
subdivider's] activity" are not so restrictively applied as to cast an
unreasonable burden of proof upon the municipality which has enacted
the ordinance under attack. In most instances it would be impossible
for the municipality to prove that the land required to be dedicated
for a park or school site was to meet a need solely attributable to the
anticipated influx of people into the community to occupy this particular
subdivision. 1
25
The court was concerned with the specific reasoning of Pioneer Trust.
If the educational and recreational burdens were caused by more than one
subdivision, for example, Pioneer Trust would hold that the problem could
not be traced to a particular development, and would thus invalidate the
exaction. Heretofore, few courts had faced the meaning of the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test and expressly rejected it.126 Nonetheless,
after noting the difficulty any municipality would face in attempting to clear
the Pioneer Trust criteria, the court stated:
On the other hand, the municipality might well be able to establish
that a group of subdivisions approved over a period of several years
had been responsible for bringing into the community a considerable
number of people making it necessary that the land dedications re-
quired of the subdividers be utilized for school, park and recreational
purposes for the benefit of such influx. In the absence of contravening
evidence this would establish a reasonable basis for finding that the
need for the acquisition was occasioned by the activity of the sub-
divider. Possible contravening evidence would be a showing that the
municipality prior to the opening up of the subdivisions, acquired
sufficient land for school, park and recreational purposes to provide
for future anticipated needs including such influx, or that the normal
growth of the municipality would have made necessary the acquisition
irrespective of the influx caused by the opening up of subdivisions. 127
The Jordan court, in essence then, shifted the burden of proof which, after
Pioneer Trust, had been on the municipality. All that was required now
was a showing by the municipality that the needs for which the exactions
were made stemmed from the influx of subdivisions in general, not from
the influx caused by a particular subdivision. If the subdivider could prove
that the exactions were not required to accommodate the subdivision resi-
dents, or that the need the exaction was to satisfy would result in any
event, the exaction would be invalidated. In effect, Jdrdan enunciated a
124. 28 Wis. 2d at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
125. Id.
126. See notes 97-107 and accompanying text supra.
127. 28 Wis. 2d at 618-19, 137 N.W.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
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test which sought only a "reasonable nexus" between the subdivision and
the exaction.
28
The court added two caveats. With apparent intent to dispose of any
Gulest remnant which might serve to cloud the application of its reasoning,
the court stated:
We do not consider the fact that other residents of the village
as well as residents of the subdivision may make use of a public site
required to be dedicated by a subdivider for school, park or recreational
purposes is particularly material to the constitutional issue.129
Finally, the court tacitly approved Ayres by invoking its rationale
anonymously:
The test of reasonableness is always applicable to any attempt to
exercise the police power. The basis for upholding a compulsory land
dedication requirement in a platting ordinance is this: The municipality
by approval of a proposed subdivision plat enables the subdivider to
profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home building sites
and thus realizes a greater price than could have been obtained if he
had sold his property as unplatted lands. In return for this benefit the
municipality may require him to dedicate part of his platted land to
meet a demand to which the municipality would not have been put but
for the influx of people into the community to occupy the subdivision
lots. 180
Thus, it can be assumed that were the subdivider to receive no net benefit
- as in the case where the dedication requirement far outstripped any
benefit gained by the plat approval - the reasonableness test by which the
police power is to be judged might not be met.
13 1
On the facts before it, the Jordan court applied its new formulation and
upheld the ordinance. 1 2 The municipality had introduced evidence to the
effect that its population had quadrupled in 14 years, due largely to the
migration of subdivision dwellers into the area. 1"' The court was not
troubled by the fact that the equalization fees paid by the subdivider were
put into a fund handled by the school district of which the subdivision was
only a part," 4 a circumstance which had been determinative in the Gulest
decision."a' Moreover, the court asserted that land dedications and fees
in lieu thereof were to be treated identically. 186
128. The court spoke of the burden as requiring one only to "reasonably establish"
that the need facing the municipality was related to the subdivision. Id. at 617, 137
N.W.2d at 447.
129. Id. at 619, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
130. Id. at 619-20, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
131. See, e.g., Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910
(1970) (exaction invalidated on ground that there was established no relationship
between amount of required dedication and either benefit accorded subdivider or
nature of problems caused by subdivision); East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger,
61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (dedication which would reduce
value of subdivider's plat from $208,000 to $118,000 held confiscatory).
132. 28 Wis. 2d at 623, 137 N.W.2d at 450.
133. Id. at 619, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
134. Id. at 611, 137 N.W.2d at 444.
135. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
136. 28 Wis. 2d at 622, 137 N.W.2d at 449-50.
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At least two other state courts have cited Jordan with approval and
seemingly accepted its approach. In the Jenad case, the Court of Appeals
of New York termed Jordan "a careful and convincing opinion,"1 37 but
delineated no "rational nexus" test to be applied in that state, although its
result could easily be characterized as consistent with such a test.138 Simi-
larly, the California Supreme Court in Associated cited Jordan as further
support for the Ayres position that the benefit conferred upon the subdivider
as a result of the plat approval should enable the municipality to exact
reasonable dedications. 139 Both Associated and Jenad implied that such
subdivision exactions were analogous to zoning requirements and, in so
doing, may have implied that the standard of proof for their justification
should be lessened, as it was in Jordan. 40 All such comments, however,
presently exist in the form of dicta, and an outright adoption of Jordan
has not, as yet, appeared.
III. THE ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS:
EXCLUSION AND EQUALIZATION
Disregarding the controversy over a police power justification of the
subdivision exaction in the recreation and education contexts, there remain
two legal issues which threaten the exaction method of revenue generation.
Although no court has made either the basis of a holding, nor actually
substantially confronted these matters in dicta, the potential for their being
stressed in an attractive and applicable factual situation cannot be ignored,
and therefore they will be briefly discussed below.
A. The Exclusionary Potential of the Subdivision Exaction
At least one court - the California Supreme Court in the Associated
case - has recognized the possibility that a municipality, unable to keep
population density at the desired level through zoning restrictions which
increase the price of residences, may set the subdivision exactions unreason-
ably high to accomplish that same result.14' Justice Van Voorhis, in his
Jenad dissent, also hinted that this tack might be used.142 However, no
137. 18 N.Y.2d at 85, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
138. This conclusion would seem to follow from the fact that the monies collected
from the exactions were used to benefit the entire community, and the court indicated
that more than one developer operating in Scarsdale was interested in the case. Id. at
84-85, 218 N.E.2d at 675-76, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957-58.
139. 4 Cal. 3d at 644, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
140. The Associated court stated that "such exactions have been compared to
admittedly valid zoning regulations such as minimum lot size and set back require-
ments." 4 Cal. 3d at 644-45, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639, citing Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955,
958 (1966).
141. 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
142. In his evaluation of the majority holding in Jenad, Justice Van Voorhis
contended:
There is no constitutional authority, by this means, to prevent city dwellers from
migrating to the suburbs or country to live in tracts which are otherwise suitably
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case has been decided to allow a land dedication or fee large enough to
reasonably invoke such a fear. Furthermore, some commentators have
concluded that as a practical matter, exclusion effectuated through exaction
should not be an issue.1 43 Several arguments are advanced in support of
this thesis, aside from the fact that exactions to date only modestly in-
creased the costs of residences. 144 For example, it has been urged in one
article that political lobbying groups, such as the National Association of
Homebuilders, will provide enough pressure to keep exaction amounts
within reasonable bounds. 145 One commentator asserts that the price in-
creases would be minimal in impact since they could be spread over the
course of a 20- or 30-year mortgage.
14
,
While such arguments may be of some persuasive force, they do not
resolve the question completely. Both contentions could have been raised
5 years ago just as persuasively with reference to exclusionary zoning tech-
niques, such as large-lot zoning.1 47 However, courts apparently found these
justifications insufficient. With the present judicial tendency to keep a
watchful eye on zoning ordinances of exclusionary potential, municipalities
will have to devise other means to pursue their exclusionary goals.
It is submitted that the nature of the subdivision exaction process
itself makes it even more likely that this device will be used in such a
manner. It seems safe to state that in the normal situation, the ultimate
buyer of a subdivision plat will not be aware of how the exaction procedure
affects him. Any dispute between municipality and subdivider will have
been resolved before individual plats are offered for sale. In the zoning
context, however, the buyer is more often initially involved in the conflict
with the municipality - he seeks to buy a Y-acre lot for a residence, and is
informed that he must purchase two acres; or he seeks a building permit
and meets a minimum set-back requirement. The distinction between ex-
developed, whenever it seem desirable to those who are already there to prevent
them from coming except at a price.
18 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 218 N.E.2d at 677, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 959 (Van Voorhis, J., dis-
senting).
143. See, e.g., Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1155-57.
144. Harvith has suggested:
The amount of dedication per dwelling unit should only be in the one to two
thousand dollar range, even if dedication were imposed in amounts (of land or
cash) sutfcient to pay the full locally paid share of the costs of the public schools
and parks required by the developments, to the extent those costs would not be
met by the tax revenues generated by the new dwelling units.
Harvith, supra note 25, at 478.
145. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, at 1156. However, it would seem axiomatic
that no political pressure is greater than that exerted by residents of exclusive areas
who have vested financial interests and therefore wish to maintain the characters
of their respective neighborhoods without incurring additional tax burdens. Indeed,
it is submitted that the cases voiding exclusionary zoning schemes were necessary to
combat just such overwhelming pressure. Note that in such cases it is in fact the
developer who is involved in the action seeking to void the schemes. See notes
1 & 2 supra.
146. Harvith, supra note 25, at 478-79. See also Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5,
at 1176.
147. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
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action and zoning ordinance suggests the possibility that exclusionary sub-
division exactions will not face court challenge as frequently as zoning
ordinances of similar effect.148 A subdivider can always pass along to the
buyer any loss he suffers on account of an exaction required by the
municipality. His only complaint with regard to his need to charge a
higher price would seem to be his fear of not finding his desired number
of buyers. If, for example, the subdivision lots were salable at extremely
high prices, the municipality, through exorbitant exaction amounts, could
increase the prices without challenge from the subdivider, unless, of course,
the subdivider would not earn his expected profit. By thus assuring itself
that only buyers who could afford the large-lot residences would be sub-
division dwellers and concomitantly freeing itself of "undesirables," the
municipality could accomplish through the subdivision exaction what it
might not have been able to do through patently exclusionary zoning. At
the same time, the municipality would be increasing its tax base and main-
taining open spaces.
Similarly, there arise the possibilities of "deals" between municipalities
and subdividers. Usually, a subdivider would be interested in the expediti-
ous completion of his project. Were he financing his project through mort-
gages, for example, he would thus be working on a planned schedule. A mu-
nicipality might be able to persuade him to sell his tract in large lots at a
proportionally higher price in return for lower exactions or time-saving
concessions. Since the subdivider would be free to sell his land as he chose,
no buyer could challenge him on that basis. Furthermore, the subdivider
might be unwilling to invest the time and money in a suit against the
municipality whose cooperation he needs to efficiently complete the develop-
ment. Through the threat of a high exaction demand when it would affect
salability - which the municipality might confidently assert after Jordan
- the governmental unit might be able to pressure the subdivider to sell
in large lots and, if he is also the builder, to construct only expensive resi-
dences, thereby effectuating a low density, high tax base subdivision with-
out ever having to impose exceptionally high exaction demands. In short,
the exaction device, which the municipality can utilize with some flexibility
148. The forcefulness of this conclusion rests, of course, not only upon the actual
frequency with which prospective purchasers and homeowner-builders, as opposed to
developers, have challenged the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, but upon whether
the prospective purchaser has standing to challenge a zoning ordinance. Obviously,
if the prospective purchaser cannot bring an action against the municipality, this dis-
tinction has little meaning. The United States Supreme Court will hopefully clarify
this issue when it decides Warth v. Seldin, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974),
granting cert. to Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the Second
Circuit held that low-income residents of a city had no standing to challenge a sub-
urban town's zoning ordinance on the ground that it violated equal protection. It
should be noted that one of the factors cited by the court as a basis of its decision
was that the plaintiffs had not alleged a specific injury, such as a denial for a vari-
ance or approval of a specific project. 495 F.2d at 1192-93. Consequently, it could be
argued that a landowner who intended to construct housing for himself would have
standing to challenge the zoning ordinance, and thus would increase the incidence of
challenge from nondeveloper parties.
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depending on how the need allegedly generated by the subdivision is con-
strued, may serve as a lever to achieve that which is not attainable through
a zoning ordinance. To date, no court or commentator has dealt with
these possibilities.
B. The Equal Protection Issue149
If the justification behind the subdivision exaction is its ability to
have newcomers fund the expenditures made as a result of their presence,
it is arguable that a similar exaction should be required of newcomers who,
while not residing in subdivisions, nonetheless cause similar burdens. The
most obvious example is the apartment complex which may contain thou-
sands of residents who require recreational and school facilities as well as
traffic and utility accommodations. The argument is one which calls for
the equal treatment of equals: those developers who cause a sizable influx
of persons into an area, as both apartment and subdivision developers do,
should be treated equally. 150 The significant question seems to be whether
there is some basis upon which to distinguish apartment developers from
subdivision developers.
Only the Associated court has confronted the issue, disposing of it as
follows:
Undeveloped land in a community is a limited resource . . . . The
development of a new subdivision in and of itself has the counter-
productive effect of consuming a substantial supply of this precious
commodity while at the same time increasing the need for park and
recreational land. In terms of economics, subdivisions diminish supply
and increase demand.
151
Distinguishing subdivisions from apartment complexes on this ground, the
court concluded that "this significant distinction justifies legislative treat-
149. It should be noted that an equal protection argument, as opposed to a due
process attack, is often at the basis of a challenge that a land use regulation is ex-
clusionary. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 2. This aspect of equal protection should
therefore be considered in conjunction with the exclusionary aspect of subdivision
exactions discussed supra.
150. In Pennsylvania, subdivision exaction ordinances may be applicable to apart-
ment complexes. The Pennsylvania enabling statute, section 501 of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code [hereinafter the Code], states in part, "The governing
body of each municipality may regulate subdivisions and land development within the
municipality by enacting a subdivision and land development ordinance." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10501 (1972) (emphasis added). In section 107 of the Code, "land
development" includes
the improvement . for any purpose involving the division or allocation of land
or space between or among two or more existing or prospective occupants by
means of, or for the purpose of streets, common areas, leaseholds, condominiums,
building groups or other features .... "
Id. § 10107(11)(i) (a). Therefore, the enabling statute does not unconstitutionally
differentiate between subdivisions and apartment complexes. Nevertheless, an equal
protection issue may arise if the particular municipality chooses to make the ordinance
applicable only to subdivisions, which the enabling statute arguably permits the munici-
pality to do.
151. 4 Cal. 3d at 641, 484 P.2d at 613-14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
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ment of the builder of an apartment house who does not subdivide differently
than the creator of a subdivision.'
52
Since Associated was concerned only with a recreation exaction re-
quirement, it seems doubtful that the court's logic can be extended to other
types of exactions. For example, it appears that, unlike their disparate effects
upon the availability of land in the recreation realm, apartment complexes
and subdivisions affect school populations in similar manners. They both
cause the need for new buildings. The key problem is not so much the
finding of open space upon which to place the buildings; rather it is the
funding of the cost of the structures and other required facilities themselves.
A potential answer to this issue may lie in the Ayres logic - endorsed by
Jordan and Associated - which points to the benefit a municipality affords
a subdivider by approving the subdivision plat and thus allowing him to,
market a tract of land at a higher price than would otherwise be possible.
15
3
Whether a similar situation exists with regard to the apartment developer
may depend upon the locality, but it appears that the issue is not one which
can be lightly treated.
5 4
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA SITUATION*: THE PROSPECTS FOR
DEVELOPING A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
SUBDIVISION EXACTION ISSUE
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (Code), 155 effective
January 1, 1969,156 contains the enabling authority for the institution of
subdivision exaction ordinances by local governmental units in Pennsyl-
vania.15 7 Though somewhat oblique in language and scope, no authoritative
construction of the fundamental subdivision exaction provisions has yet
been offered by either the Pennsylvania Superior, Commonwealth, or
Supreme Courts.' 58 Pennsylvania, within the confines of what a reasonable
interpretation of this legislation will permit, thus has the opportunity to
choose an approach to the subdivision exaction dilemma unrestricted by
binding precedent. It is submitted that this choice is sufficiently important
to warrant careful deliberation. For this reason, a brief treatment of what
the statute seems to allow, followed by recommendations with regard to its
future interpretation, are offered.
152. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
153. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
154. One commentator concludes that the issue as to equal treatment is probably
one of constitutional proportions. Harvith, supra note 25, at 476.
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101 et seq. (1972).
156. Id. § 10102.
157. Id. §§ 10501-15.
158. Although the Superior Court of Pennsylvania formerly had appellate juris-
diction over challenges to subdivision ordinances enacted under prior law in Pennsyl-
vania and those arising under the present Code before January, 1970, Act of May 8,
1956, § 1, [1955] P.L. 1540 (repealed 1970), appellate jurisdiction over such contro-
versies has now been vested in the new Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.402(4) (Supp. 1974).
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A. Restrictions on Subdivision Exactidn Ordinances in Pennsylvania
Section 503 of the Code, 159 which refers to the permissible contents of
a municipality's subdivision exaction ordinance, is most significant for
purposes of deriving the legislative attitude toward the subdivision exaction
qua means of generating revenues. It is most important to note that section
503 lists permissible subjects for exaction, but specifically states that the
local ordinance "need not be limited to" what is therein set forth.160 The
section further authorizes the inclusion of provisions within the ordinance
ensuring that the subdivision conforms to the municipality's comprehensive
plan,161 and permits the local unit, with certain exceptions, to condition its
approval of the plat upon the installation of "streets . . . graded and im-
proved, and walkways, curbs, gutters, street lights, fire hydrants, water and
sewage facilities" as the municipality may deem necessary. 16 2 As has been
demonstrated, none of these requirements have, in the recent past, created
any serious policy or constitutional conflicts in any jurisdiction, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. 63
It seems clear that broad exaction provisions tending more toward
the constitutional fringe would have to find authorization in the "need not
be limited to" language. In this regard, the municipalities of Pennsylvania
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503 (1972). This section provides:
The subdivision and land development ordinance may include, but need not
be limited to:
(1) Provisions for the submittal and processing of plats, and specifications
for such plats, including provisions for preliminary and final approval and for
processing of final approval by stages or sections of development.
(2) Provisions for insuring that: (i) the layout or arrangement of the sub-
division or land development shall conform to the comprehensive plan and to any
regulations or maps adopted in furtherance thereof; (ii) streets in and bordering
a subdivision or land development shall be coordinated, and be of such widths and
grades and in such locations as deemed necessary to accommodate prospective
traffic, and facilitate fire protection; (iii) adequate easements or rights-of-way
shall be provided for drainage and utilities; (iv) reservations if any by the
developer of any area designed for use as public grounds shall be suitable [sic]
size and location for their designated uses; (v) and land which is subject to
flooding, subsidence or underground fires either shall be made safe for the purpose
for which such land is proposed to be used, or that such land shall be set aside
for uses which shall not endanger life or property or further aggravate or in-
crease the existing menace.
(3) Provisions governing the standards by which streets shall be graded and
improved, and walkways, curbs, gutters, street lights, fire hydrants, water and
sewage facilities and other improvements shall be installed as a condition precedent
to final approval of plats.
(4) Provisions which take into account land development not intended for
the immediate erection of buildings where streets, curbs, gutters, street lights, fire
hydrants, water and sewage facilities and other improvements may not be possible
to install as a condition precedent to final approval of plats, but will be a condition
precedent to the erection of buildings on lands included in the approved plat.
(5) Provisions for encouraging and promoting flexibility economy and in-
genuity in the layout and design of subdivisions and land developments including
provisions authorizing the planning agency to alter site requirements and for
encouraging other practices which are in accordance with modern and evolving
principles of site planning and development.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
160. Id. See note 159 supra.
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503(2) (i) (1972). See note 159 supra.
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503(3) (1972). See note 159 supra.
163. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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should analyze the implications of section 503(2) (iv), wherein it is pro-
vided that the local ordinance may contain provisions to insure that
"reservations if any by the developer of any area designed for use as
public grounds shall be suitable [sic] size and location for their designated
uses."'16 4 "Public grounds" is defined to include "parks, playgrounds and
other public areas; and ... sites for schools .... -165 Although not specific-
ally defined in this particular provision, other portions of the Code make
it clear that a "reservation" includes only the developer's setting aside
certain areas for future taking by eminent domain. It does not involve a
dedication. 166
Pennsylvania has, therefore, not even clearly granted municipalities
the right to condition subdivision plat approval upon their present buying
of land from the subdivider for park or school purposes. At most, the
municipality is allowed to enact provisions insuring that "the layout or
arrangement of the subdivision or land development shall conform to the
comprehensive plan and to any regulations or maps adopted in furtherance
thereof.' 167 The comprehensive plan, however, as legislatively defined, only
includes the "recommendations" of the planning agency. 168 If the "map"
referred to in Section 503(2) (i) is construed to mean the official map of the
municipality - another legislatively circumscribed land use control device
- it is possible that a reservation could be compelled. 16 9 In point of fact,
however, in no part of the Municipalities Planning Code is there an au-
thorization to require the dedication of a public ground as defined in the
Code for any purpose whatsoever.
It does not necessarily follow that a local ordinance requiring such a
dedication must fail in Pennsylvania. By its own terms, the Code's list
of permissible exaction areas is not all-inclusive.' 70 Because the permissi-
bility of requiring such a dedication is an area which seems especially suited
for legislative treatment, it is possible to argue that had the legislature
intended to allow it, they would have said so. But the converse would also
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503(2) (iv) (1972) (emphasis added).
165. Id. § 10107(17).
166. For example, section 406 of the Code speaks of the "[t]ime limitations on
reservations for future taking" in the context of official maps. Id. § 10406 (emphasis
added). For a brief discussion of official maps, see note 169 infra.
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503(2) (i) (1972). See note 159 supra.
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10301 et seq. (1972).
169. The official map legislation is set forth in article IV of the Code. Id. §§
10401 et seq. Essentially, these provisions enable a municipality to make surveys of
existing and proposed public streets and grounds to be included in an official map,
thereby to make these areas a part of the municipality through condemnation at a
future date. Id. § 10401. For a case treating the validity of the device in a context
where a subdivider could not obtain approval of his plat since it was reserved for
park use on an official map, see Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor and Common Council,
51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968). However, Section 404 of the Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10404 (1972), specifically states that the mere designation of an area
on an official map does not constitute a taking or acceptance of the area. Under
section 406, the municipality may designate when these areas on the official map "shall
be deemed reserved for future taking or acquisition for public use." Id. § 10406.
Nowhere is there authorization for requiring a dedication as a prerequisite to approval
of a subdivider's plot.
170. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
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seem true: if it were repugnant, it would be statutorily labelled as such. In
short, the existing enabling legislation, though certainly no endorsement of
ordinances requiring land dedication for these public purposes, does not
stand as an unalterable bar to their enaction.
The real problem seems to lie in the sparse precedent which does
exist in areas analogous to the subdivision exaction. It sets a strong tone
against the approval of these fund-producing devices. For example, in
Doran Investments v. Muhlenberg Township Board of Commissioners,1'7 1
a developer appealed the denial of his application for approval after having
met all conditions required by the local planned residential development
ordinance, 17 2 including the setting aside of the required amount of open
space. The zoning board had objected on the ground that the proposed
course of the project's development "[would] result in a reduction in the
amount of actual usable recreational area.' 73 The board's specific grievance
was not altogether clear, but the Doran court reasoned as follows:
We may, however, infer that since some of this privately owned land
is to be reserved for the use of the tenants in the project, the Board's
objection is that the developer is not providing a public park. The
Board might have attempted to acquire public recreation grounds in
this fashion by discussion with the developer; it may not under our
constitution make dedication of land a condition precedent to its ap-
proval of a lawful use.1
74
The basis upon which this court drew its inference regarding the
foundation of the board's complaint was no clearer than the complaint
itself. But even if this language is taken as vague dicta, it is exceptionally
surprising that the court would, in 1973, with cases such as Jordan,
Associated, Ayres, and Jenad extant, reason as it did. Although Doran
did not entail a subdivision exaction, the court's analysis would appear
applicable to that situation.
The only other example of the judicial attitude among the Pennsylvania
appellate courts was provided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
171. 10 Pa. Comm. Ct. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973).
172. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to article VII of the Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701 et seq. (1972). "Planned residential development" is defined in
section 107 of the Code as
an area of land, controlled by a landowner, to be developed as a single entity for
a number of dwelling units, the development plan for which does not correspond
in lot size, bulk or type of dwelling, density, lot coverage and required open space
to the regulations established in any one residential district created, from time to
time, under the provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance.
Id. § 10107(14). The primary purpose of the "planned residential development" scheme
is to allow a developer some flexibility in constructing dwelling units on a large tract
of land without having every dwelling unit conform to local zoning ordinances yet
remaining subject to approval by the municipality. See id. § 10701. In Doran, for
example, the developer planned to build 14 single-family homes, 56 garden apartments,
and 133 townhouses on a 45-acre tract, leaving 10 acres for recreational purposes. The
area was zoned for single family units on 8000-square-foot lots. 10 Pa. Comm. Ct.
at 143, 309 A.2d at 452.
173. 10 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 157, 309 A.2d at 458.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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Miller v. Beaver Falls,175 a 1951 decision. In that case, the court faced
a challenge to the constitutional validity of the ancestor to the present official
map legislation set forth in the Municipalities Planning Code.'76  That
former legislation allowed the reservation for future eminent domain taking
of certain lands located within a municipality, 177 and the question was
whether the act of reserving the land constituted a taking as of the time of
the reservation. In a decision which is apparently unique in the field, 178
the court applied standard principles to a reservation of land for future
taking to be used for recreational purposes:
It has long been well settled that the mere plotting of a street upon a
city plan without anything more does not constitute a taking of land
in a constitutional sense so as to give an abutting owner the right to
have damages assessed. The doctrine is said to be founded upon
equitable considerations and wise public policy ...
Shall this principle relating to streets, which are narrow, well
defined and absolutely necessary, be extended to parks and playgrounds
which may be very large and very desirable but not necessary? 179
Declaring the legislation unconstitutional, the court concluded that "[t]he
law with respect to streets is too firmly established in Pennsylvania to be
changed, but that is no reason or justification for extending it."' 80 Thus,
there was manifested a discontent with even a reservation requirement,
pursuant to the official map provisions, as to streets. Discontent with a
dedication for parks would seem necessarily to follow if required by a sub-
division exaction ordinance.
Such has been the case in the few lower court decisions which have
arisen in the subdivision exaction area. For example, in one decision, the
court reversed the municipality's refusal to approve a subdivision plan for
its failure to dedicate a sewer easement, and noted that such an easement
could have been acquired only through condemnation.' 8 ' Another court
refused to allow the conditioning of approval of a subdivision plan upon
public street dedication, asserting:
Neither the Executive nor the Legislature, nor any legislative
body, nor any zoning or planning commission, nor any other Govern-
mental body has the right - under the guise of the police power, or
under the broad power of general welfare, or under the power of
175. 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
176. Act of June 23, 1931, § 3702, [1931] Pa. L. 1085, reenacted and amended,
Act of June 28, 1951, [1951-52] Pa. L. 855 (repealed 1969).
177. Id. For a brief discussion of the present official map provisions, see note
169 supra.
178. Johnston, supra note 7, draws this conclusion in his brief treatment of Miller,
and concludes that "[n]evertheless, so long as the period of reservation is not unrea-
sonably long and the owner is not denied all beneficial use of his property, this type
of statute could be upheld by analogy to street-mapping or interim-zoning ordinances."
Id. at 906.
179. 368 Pa. at 193, 82 A.2d at 36 (emphasis supplied by the court) (citations
omitted).
180. Id. at 194-95, 82 A.2d at 37.
181. Lukens v. Upper Moreland Twp., 82 Pa. D.&C. 308 (Montg. County Pa.
C.P. 1952). 34
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Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, or under any other express
or implied power - to take, possess or confiscate private property for
public use.
It is clear that the township may not in effect compel a property
owner to dedicate formally his land for public use without compen-
sation.
182
B. The Need for Reevaluation in Pennsylvania
After noting the constitutional developments surrounding the valida-
tion of subdivision exactions through the mid-1960's, one commentator
opined that "courts in other jurisdictions will be forced to examine or
reexamine their own precedents in light of these decisions.' u8 3 Pennsyl-
vania, for all practical purposes, stands in the anomalous position of having
no real appellate precedent to analyze. Given the well-known financial
plight which both the state and its local units continue to endure, it would
seem to require strong justification for the Commonwealth to ignore a
potential source of funds. The most compelling argument against a dedi-
cation for purposes which might benefit the community as well as the sub-
division is the assertion that subdivision residents would be assuming an
unfair share of the financial burden; or, at least, that it would be impossible
to calculate the fair share they should assume.
But there are persuasive opposing arguments. First, the initial justi-
fication behind the subdivision exaction is the correction of an imbalance.
Were it not for the imposition of some such equalization device, new-
comers would benefit from schools and parks for which they took no initial
financial responsibility, while being required only to share through general
taxation the cost of expanding the facilities which their presence rendered
inadequate. 8 4 Second, as one commentator argued, it may be possible for
the jurisdiction whose constitutional sensibilities require such exactness
to employ modern cost accounting techniques to relate need and exaction
precisely. 8 5 This is extremely important because it lends new dimensions
182. Vauclain Appeal, 33 Pa D.&C.2d 104, 110 (Del. County Pa. C.P. 1963),
quoting Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 77, 84-85, 188 A.2d 709, 712
(1963), and Beattie v. Lower Moreland Twp., 76 Montg. Co. L. Rptr. 632, 635
(Montg. Co. Pa. C.P. 1960) (emphasis in original).
183. Johnston, supra note 7, at 922.
184. Of course, this contention ignores the fact that the property being subdivided
was previously subject to the property tax and therefore contributed to the financing
of existing school and recreational construction. However, the previous condition of
such land was unimproved; the assessed value was less and, consequently, so was the
property tax. Thus, the previous contribution of the now-subdivided land was small
relative to the contribution in the form of property taxes from the existing resi-
dential property.
185. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 5, argue that modern cost accounting tech-
niques are available to relate cost to exaction in order to avoid questions of discrimi-
nation and taking. They assert that this could be accomplished by a system exacting
only fees. In this manner, a formula could be developed to determine exactly theamount needed for school or park projects and the proportion of responsibility which
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to the Jordan "rational nexus" test. If the state were fearful that the sub-
division exaction would create a worse imbalance, it need only construct
judicially, on a case-by-case basis, an acceptable standard of proof. The
opportunity for flexibility exists, especially in Pennsylvania, and there have
been no arguments to the effect that data which could form the groundwork
for a rational conclusion regarding the extent to which a subdivision should
be responsible for remedying a particular community need cannot be com-
piled in specific cases.' 8 6 Even if this were not totally possible, until the
United States Supreme Court rules upon the issue, the constitutional need
for such precision does not exist. Of course, the state has the option to so
require within the Commonwealth. In any event, the need to formulate
some position on subdivision exactions, if only for clarification, is a real
one. The most important facet of the legal theory in this area is its in-
definiteness; the process of constitutionally regulating the imposition of
exactions which inure to public as well as subdivision benefit can be con-
ducted as the court sees fit. There is little'excuse for inaction. It is sub-
mitted that the Pennsylvania appellate courts should, in lieu of legislative
action, seize the first opportunity to relate this state's stance to the nation's
developing position on these issues. Whether the goal is to promote or
deter the exaction device, a position must be formulated.
V. CONCLUSION
It would seem appropriate to conclude by offering a reasoned judg-
ment upon which of the varied approaches to the subdivision exaction
problems seems the most fitting. Unfortunately, such pat judgments cannot
be made in an area which depends to such a great degree upon the positing
of policy formulations. The choice to be made with regard to constitutional
methodology in this realm is not to be tied to a general principle which all
would accept such as the evenhanded treatment of all those similarly
situated. The fundamental question which must be confronted is the degree
to which a newcomer into a community should be held responsible for
failing to contribute at a time when he was not present to that which he
will now make use of; likewise the amount of responsibility he should
assume in the process of making amends for his former failure to contribute
for that which he will use in the future. The Pioneer Trust and Gulest
schemes are founded upon the presumption that the newcomer should in
no way be faulted for his presence; the Ayres and especially the Jordan
should be levied upon each family, according to such factors as their number of resi-
dents, etc. They also advocate the proportionate sharing of old and new debt service.
Id. at 1141-46. Without elaboration, one commentator asserts that the technique might
lead to "bureaucratic hegemony," in that without a massive data compilation network
it could not, for example, separate true newcomers from longtime residents in the
area who happen to be moving into the particular subdivision. See Feldman, supra
note 23, at 659-60.
186. At no time does Feldman, supra note 23, contend that the data could not be
compiled. His only objection is to the bureaucracy he contends would be involved.
Id. at 660. There have been no other criticisms of this suggestion which have been
developed to any extent, nor have there been any equally well-reasoned endorsements.
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formats imply that the longtime resident should not bear the burden of
the new arrival and, in fact, should, as a matter of fairness, reap some
benefit. In addition, there exists the problem of the extent to which in-
exactness in calculating and assessing responsibility as between newcomer
and longtime resident can be tolerated. These judgments are functions of
individual value preferences; hence, no definitive answers are possible.
Moreover, they are not judgments which can be made in isolation from
other choices which must be made vis-a-vis local government, such as the
burden of proof the municipality should be required to bear in its invocation
of any police power regulation, and evaluating the legitimacy of the quality
and character of the locale that the municipality desires to obtain. These
are tasks for those arms of government whose responsibility it is to probe
the individualities of their jurisdiction for indications of which revenue-
producing tools would be most fair and effective. This is not an area for
generalization.
This observation in itself, however, indicates a problem of far wider
scope. The obvious question is why state and local government would so
much as bother with the attempted application of a measure beset by such
a boggle of policy and methodological difficulties. The obvious answer
underlines the effects of desperation when applied to the need for funds.
In short, if nothing else, the study of the subdivision exaction highlights
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